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Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic model of price competition in which sellers are endowed with
one unit of the good and compete by posting prices in every period. Buyers each demand one
unit of the good and have a common reservation price. They have full information regarding
the prices posted by each rm in the market; hence, search is costless. The number of buyers
coming to the market in each period is random. We characterize the dynamics of market prices
and show that price dispersion persists over time.
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All remaining errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
This paper captures the dynamic properties of price dispersion by introducing an innite time
horizon model of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. Specically, we consider a dynamic model of
price competition in which sellers are endowed with one unit of the good and compete by posting
prices in every period to maximize their expected prots with discounting. The number of buyers
coming to the market in each period is random. Buyers each demand one unit of the good and have
a common reservation price. They have full information regarding the prices posted by each rm
in the market; hence, search is costless. We show that when excess demand occurs with positive
probability, our model has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
sellers post prices according to non-degenerate distributions determined by the number of sellers,
and the lowest possible market price, dened as the greatest lower bound of the support of the
distribution played by sellers, is decreasing in the number of sellers. In other words, interrm price
dispersion not only exists in every period, but it also persists over time.
The used-textbook market on the internet is one example which ts our model well. At the end
of each academic year, some students (sellers) try to sell their used textbooks by posting them on
Amazon.com. Each seller has only one used textbook for sale, and we may assume that sellers adjust
prices daily to maximize the expected revenue with discounting. Books are treated homogeneously
by potential buyers if they have the same used-condition (e.g., like new). Clearly, buyers each
demand one used textbook, and it is reasonable to assume that they have approximately the same
reservation price. Furthermore, this market features demand uncertainty: the number of buyers
coming to the market is uncertain in every period. Consequently this market satises the framework
of our model, and, consistent with the prediction of our model, the phenomenon of price dispersion
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is prevalent in this market.1
Other applications of our model include certain labor markets. Consider the following envi-
ronment. A xed number of workers in the labor market wait for an opportunity to be hired by
potential employers by posting their wages in each period. Workers have the same productivity;
hence, they are homogeneous to potential employers. In every period, employers come to the mar-
ket randomly. There is one position to be lled in each rm; thus each employer hires the worker
with the lowest posted wage if it is below some reservation wage for the rm.
The model can also be applied to "scalping." At some universities, students are eligible to
buy one ticket for most sports events. Some students oer to resell the ticket by posting a price
on ebay.com. Interested buyers come to the market randomly. Tickets are homogeneous if they
are located in the same section, and the buyer buys one ticket if the price is less than some
reservation price. Students change the price daily (or hourly) to maximize their expected revenue
with discounting.
Conventional wisdom says that the \law of one price" holds in markets of homogeneous goods,
but substantial studies provide evidence that price dispersion is ubiquitous and persistent even on
the internet, the so called frictionless market. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) investigate prices of
books and CD's on the internet and at conventional sellers over a 15-month period and nd that,
although internet prices are lower than in conventional stores, price dispersion is more signicant on
the internet. Bailey (1998) compares the prices of 125 books, 108 musical titles, and 104 software
titles sold in 1996 and 1997 through 52 internet and conventional outlets and nds that price
dispersion among e-tailers is as least as great as that among conventional retailers.
1For example, when we checked the textbook "Probability and Measure" by Patrick Billingsley at Amazon.com,
we got 29 sellers oering prices for new books and these prices range from $67 all the way up to $159.
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Several previous studies have oered models to explain this puzzling empirical nding. Some
authors attribute the occurance of price dispersion to heterogeneity of consumers or rms (e.g.,
Gatti (2000), Janssen and Moraga (2004), Milyo and Waldfogel (1999), Reinganum (1979), Rosen-
thal (1980), Salop and Stiglitz (1976), and Varian (1980)). Reinganum (1979) assumes that rms
have dierent production costs. In Salop and Stiglitz (1976), consumers have dierent costs of
information acquisition. In Wilde and Schwartz (1979), consumers have dierent propensities to
search.
Some papers address the issue of price dispersion by introducing demand uncertainty or capacity
constraints into the model (e.g., Arnold (2000), Dana (1999) and Prescott (1975)). Equilibrium
price dispersion under perfect competition with demand uncertainty was rst introduced by Prescott
(1975) in his well-known "hotel model". Suppose there is a stochastic demand n for hotel rooms
with distribution F (n). All demanders are identical and purchase one unit if the price is below
some reservation price p: Owners of rooms incur cost c of providing one unit and set their price
before the realization of demand, and entry is free. Under such a market structure, Prescott shows
that in an equilibrium we have a distribution of prices rather than a single price.
Deneckere and Peck (2005) develop a dynamic version of Prescott's \hotel model." In an equi-
librium, they show that there is price dispersion in the rst period, followed by all rms learning the
demand and charging the market-clearing price in the second period. The price dispersion comes
from the trade-o between selling at the current price or selling at a higher price later if demand is
strong or a lower price later if demand is revealed to be weak. Moreover, in Prescott's static model
equilibrium is inecient whenever consumers are heterogeneous. They demonstrate that eciency
can be restored by embedding the model in a dynamic framework.
Assuming bounded rationality, Baye and Morgan (2004) show that price dispersion occurs
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in epsilon and quantal response equilibria in a homogeneous product market where the uniform
price Nash equilibrium is predicted in Bertrand competition. Statistical tests of two laboratory
experiment data sets support the bounded rationality hypothesis and the pattern of price dispersion
derived from it.
Burdett and Judd (1983), Gatti (2000) and Stigler (1961) characterize price dispersion equilib-
rium from the viewpoint of consumer search behavior. Burdett and Judd demonstrate that ex ante
heterogeneity is not necessary to explain the appearance of price dispersion. In their model, rms
maximize their expected prots given their beliefs about consumer search behavior, and consumers
minimize their expected cost (i.e., buying price plus search cost) of purchasing one unit given their
beliefs about the distribution of prices in the market. They construct a price dispersion equilibrium
in which some consumers search once and others search twice. Price dispersion equilibria, however,
cannot be sustained if search is costless. Thus the phonomenon of price dispersion on the internet
cannot be explained from their model.
This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the existence of price dispersion in a homo-
geneous product market. Unlike other papers which assume static competition, our model allows
sellers to compete in multiple periods. With discounting, each seller prefers to sell earlier rather
than sell later if they can sell at the same price. We call this a discounting eect. On the other
hand, the market is less competitive in the future since sellers with lower prices will be out of
the market. So in order to sell earlier a seller must accept a lower price. We call this a compe-
tition eect. Consequently sellers maximize expected prot by balancing these two eects. In an
equilibrium sellers play mixed-strategies because they are indierent between posting a lower price
and selling earlier and posting a higher price but selling later. This indierence contributes to the
appearance of price dispersion.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple binary demand model. Section
3 extends the model in section 2 by generalizing the underlying demand structure, and demon-
strates that price dispersion occurs when excess demand occurs with positive probability. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Binary Demand Model
Suppose there are N sellers in the market, and each of them has one unit of the good. Goods are
non-perishable and homogeneous. The cost is normalized to 0 for each seller. Time is discrete and
is indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; ::. in an innite horizon. Denote pit to be the price posted by seller i in
period t. Each seller has to post a price before the demand is revealed in every period. In each
period, the demand is either 0 or 1 with probability q and 1   q respectively, where 0 < q < 1.
All potential buyers have the same reservation price p: The buyer arriving in period t desires one
unit of the good and can only buy the object in period t, so waiting is not allowed. Hence, the
arriving buyer buys one unit of the good at the lowest price if and only if the price is no greater
than p. We assume that when there is a tie (the number of sellers at the lowest price is more than
1), each seller has an equal chance of making the sale.2 Each seller i chooses price path fpitg to
maximize the present discounted value of expected prots with a common discount factor , where
0 <  < 1. Once the unit is sold, the seller is out of the market. Denote the current state variable St
to be the number of units of goods remaining in the market at the beginning of period t. A selling
game described above is given by  (N; q): Since tacit collusion is not what we are concerned with,
throughout this paper the equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium(SPNE)
2This assumption can be dropped without changing any of our results.
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without tacit collusion.
Denition 1 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium without tacit collusion: A SPNE in which each
seller's strategy in every period depends on the current state variable St only. Hence, intertemporal
punishments are not allowed in an equilibrium.
First we notice that the environment is completely homogeneous. Goods are homogeneous,
consumers have the same reservation price, and sellers have the same discount factor, capacity
constraints and cost structure. Second, we see that there is no search cost. Consumers can observe
the prices posted by each seller without paying any cost.
Next we oer some denitions. In the selling game  (N; q); dene V (p;N) to be the expected
prot for a seller who simply posts a price p in every period and others post prices strictly less than
p. Then V (p; 1) is just the monopoly prot and can be calculated as
V (p; 1) = qV (p; 1) + (1  q)p
=
1  q
1  q p (1)
We have the following relation:
V (p;N) = qV (p;N) + (1  q)V (p;N   1)
=
(1  q)V (p;N   1)
1  q (2)
In the selling game  (N; q); denote by pN the price which gives a seller an expected prot equal
to V (p;N) if he simply posts a price pN in every period that is the lowest price in the market and
there are no other sellers setting a price at pN : Therefore p

N satises the following equation:
V (p;N) =
1  q
1  q p

N (3)
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From equations (1), (2) and (3) we can solve
V (p;N) =

(1  q)
1  q
N 1 1  q
1  q p (4)
pN =

(1  q)
1  q
N 1
p (5)
We observe that p1 = p and pN = V (p;N   1):
Our rst proposition characterizes an equilibrium in duopoly with the binary demand structure.
Proposition 1 For the binary demand duopoly model, each seller adopts the strategy pt = p

n for
all t s:t: St = n constitutes a unique equilibrium in the selling game  (2; q); and the expected prot
for each seller is exactly V (p; 2): Hence, there is no price dispersion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that when there are two sellers in the market and in each period there is at
most one consumer coming to the market with some positive probability 1 q, a unique equilibrium
must have both sellers set their prices at p2 > 0. Hence any asymmetric pricing behavior, pure or
mixed, will never be observed. Therefore, price disperison cannot happen in duopoly with binary
demand. We notice that the probability of excess demand is zero since there is at most one consumer
coming to the market in every period. In section 3, we will show that price dispersion must happen
when the probability of excess demand is positive.
Next we characterize the equilibrium in the selling game  (N; q). Let Fit(p) denote the equi-
librium mixed strategy seller i plays in period t in the selling game  (N; q): Dene lit = supfp :
Fit(p) = 0g and uit = inffp : Fit(p) = 1g: Dene t(p) to be the number of sellers who set a price
at p with probability one in period t.
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Proposition 2 For the binary demand model with N rms, any equilibirum in the selling game
 (N; q) has the following properties: (a) lit  pk 8 i; for all t s.t. St = k; (b) t(pk)  2 for all t
s.t. St = k  2; and (c) the expected prot for each seller is exactly V (p;N):
Proof. Since most of the reasoning are parallel to the proof in Proposition 1, here we just give
a sketch of the proof. When N = 2, the conclusion follows from Proposition 1. The proof proceeds
by induction. Suppose the Proposition holds in the selling game  (N   1; q): For a selling game
 (N; q); pick any period t with St = N and WLOG let l1t  l2t  :::  lNt: Following the same
line of reasoning in Claim 1 of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that l1t = l2t  pN and (a) is
established. For part (b), let us dene Vi(t) to be the present discount value of expected prot to
the seller i at period t, Vi(t + 1) to be the present discounted value of seller i's expected prot in
period t+1 conditional on zero demand in period t, and F i(p) to be the joint probability that all
sellers except i set the price less or equal to p. Clearly F i(p) is right continuous. Now we notice
that l1t = l2t > p

N cannot be sustained in any equilibrium. If it were indeed the case, then the
expected prot for seller 1 from posting a price at l1t would be
V1(t) = qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F 1(l1t)1
2
(V (p;N   1) + l1t) + (1  F 1(l1t))l1t] (6)
Observing that F 1(l1t) > 0 cannot be the case, as it implies that
V1(t) ! qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F 1(l1t)1
2
(V (p;N   1) + l1t) + (1  F 1(l1t))l1t]
< qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)l1t as p& l1t ; (7)
which implies that either a maximizer does not exist for seller 1 or supfp : F1t(p) = 0g > lit; a
contradiction. But F 1(l1t) also cannot be zero. F 1(l1t) = 0 implies that conditional on demand
being one in period t, the expected prot for every seller is at least lit; which in turn implies that
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u1t = u2t = ::: = uNt and Fit(uit ) = 1 8i: Also by the right continuity of F 1(p); Fit must
be non-degenerate for some i. It is easy to see that it cannot be supported in any equilibrium.
Consequently l1t = l2t = p

N is the only feaslible outcome. Suppose now that none of sellers plays
pN with probability 1, then F 1(p

N ) < 1 and right continuity again implies that seller 1 will set
a price greater than pN ; violating the condition l1t = p

N : Hence this cannot be the case also, and
(b) is established. (c) follows from (a) and (b) immediately. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 implies that if there are N>2 sellers in the market, in any equilibirum all sellers
will post prices no less than pN (the lowest market price), and at least two sellers will post prices
at pN with probability one. Moreover, all sellers have the same expected prot in any equilibrium,
which is exactly equal to V (p;N); the expected prot for a monopoly when consumers' reservation
price is pN . Since we have \(N-2) degrees" of freedom in choosing prices between [p

N ; p]; one
reasonable outcome is that (N-2) non-marginal sellers will set the price randomly. In this case, the
model says that only the lowest market price can be predicted, and the degree of price dispersion
is unpredictable! This result is not surprising at all. Since the probability of demand greater than
one is zero, any non-marginal seller is indierent between any two prices in the intervel [pN ; p]:
No one has an incentive to trigger a price war by cutting prices less than pN ; which makes the
expected prot lower according to the denition of pN . Therefore in every period, we may observe
a distribution of prices rather than a single price. In terms of the actual transaction price, the
lowest market price in this case, there is a unique eective price in the market, for at most one
buyer will come to the market in every period. Under this denition we cannot say that it is a
price dispersion equilibrium. However, in section 3 we will show that even under this more rigorous
denition, equilibrium price dispersion still appears.
10
It has been shown that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist in general when capacity
constraints are introduced into a Bertrand competition model. Such result does not happen in
our model. For example, each seller sets a price at pn 8t s.t. St = n constitutes a pure strategy
equilibrium. Also in the standard model of Bertrand competition, a unique equilibrium occurs
when sellers set prices equal to marginal cost and earn zero prots, but this equilibrium is not
supported by empirical studies. After introducing demand uncertainty and capacity constraints,
our model avoids such problems and every seller earns strictly positive prots.
Proposition 3 For the binary demand oligopoly model; pN is (a) linearly increasing in p; (b)
increasing and convex in ; (c) decreasing and convex in N and (d) decreasing in q and convex in
q if N > 2(1 q)1  :
Proof. Part (a) is trivial. For part (b), taking the log of both sides of equation (5)
ln pN = (N   1) [ln(1  q)   ln(1  q)] + ln p (8)
Taking a derivative w.r.t. ; we get
1
pN
@pN
@
= (N   1)

1

+
q
1  q

(9)
Therefore
@pN
@
= (N   1)

1

+
q
1  q

pN > 0 (10)
Taking a derivative w.r.t.  again, we get
@2pN
@2
= (N   1)

@pN
@
(
1

+
q
1  q ) + p

N (
 1
2
+
q2
(1  q)2 )

= (N   1)

(n  1)(1

+
q
1  q )
2   1
2
+
q2
(1  q)2 )

pN > 0 (11)
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For part (c), taking a derivative w.r.t. N in equation (5), we get
@pN
@N
=

1

+
q
1  q
N 1
p ln[
1

+
q
1  q ] < 0
@2pN
@N2
=

1

+
q
1  q
N 1
p

ln(
1

+
q
1  q )
2
> 0 (12)
For part (d), taking a derivative w.r.t. q in ln pN ; we get
@pN
@q
= (N   1)
  1
1  q +

1  q

pN
= (N   1)

   1
(1  q)(1  q)

pN < 0 (13)
Taking a derivative w.r.t. q again, we get
@2pN
@q2
= (N   1)

@pN
@q
(
   1
(1  q)(1  q)) + p

N
(1  )( 1   + 2q)
[(1  q)(1  q)]2

= (N   1)(1  )pN
(N   1)(1  )  (1 + ) + 2q
[(1  q)(1  q)]2 (14)
Therefore,
@2pN
@q2
> 0 i N >
2(1  q)
1   (15)
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 says that pN ; the lowest market price when there are N sellers in the market, is
higher when sellers become more patient, the reservation price of consumers is higher, or demand
is stronger. Furthermore, it is a decreasing and convex function of the number of sellers.
3 Generalized Demand Structure
So far we were considering with an environment in which demand is either zero or one in every
period. Sellers may charge dierent prices because posting any price above the lowest market price
makes no dierence to them, leading to price dispersion. Some may doubt whether price dispersion
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can happen if there is a positive probability of excess demand, i.e., a positive probability that the
number of arriving buyers is larger than the number of units supplied. In this section, we show
that price dispersion must appear when there is a positive probability of excess demand.
This section extends the model in section 2 by generalizing the underlying demand structure.
We follow the same setup as in section 1 except that in each period the demand is i units with
probability qi = 0; i = 0; 1; 2; ::: and
P1
i=0 qi = 1: We denote such selling game as  (N; fqig1i=0):
Dene V (p;N) to be the expected prot for a seller who simply posts a price p in every period and
others post prices strictly less than p. Then
V (p; 1) = q0V (p; 1) +
1X
i=1
qip =
1  q0
1  q0 p (16)
We have the following relation:
V (p;N) = q0V (p;N) + q1V (p;N   1) + :::+ qN 1V (p; 1) +
1X
i=N
qip
=
1
1  q0 [
N 1X
i=1
qiV (p;N   i) +
1X
i=N
qip] (17)
It is easy to see that V (p; 1) > V (p; 2) > ::: > V (p;N): In  (N; fqig1i=0); let pN be the price
which yields a seller an expected prot V (p;N) if he simply posts a price pN in every period which
is the lowest price in the market and there are no other sellers setting a price at pN : Therefore, p

N
satises the following equation:
V (p;N) =
1  q0
1  q0 p

N (18)
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Dene two distributions Wi() : [0;1)! [0; 1] i = 1; 2 as:
W1(p) =
8>><>>:
1 ; p  p
0 ; p < p
(19)
W2(p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 ; p > p
1 
P1
2 qi
q1
[p V (p;1)p V (p;1)   1] ; p2  p  p
0 ; p < p2
(20)
W1(p) is a degenerate distribution which puts probability one at p. W2(p) is a distribution with
supfx :W2(x) = 0g = p2 and inffx :W2(x) = 1g = p:
The following proposition characterizes a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in duopoly
with the generalized demand structure.
Proposition 4 With the conditions q0 6= 0; q1 6= 0; and
P1
i=2 qi > 0; the duopoly model with a
general demand structure has a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium which exhibits price
dispersion. Specically, each seller plays Wn(p) for all t s:t: St = n constitutes a unique symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium in the selling game  (2; fqig1i=0); and the expected prot for each seller
is exactly V (p; 2).
Proof. The case St = 1 is trivial. Pick any period t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g s.t. St = 2: It is easy
to show that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist in the selling game  (2; fqig1i=0) when
q0 6= 0; q1 6= 0; and
P1
i=2 qi > 0. Now we show that a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists.
Let F (p) : [0;1) ! [0; 1] denote the mixed-strategy played in period t in an equilbrium, and we
dene l = supfp : F (p) = 0g and u = inffp : F (p) = 1g: Assume F () is dierentiable. Also we
dene Vi(t) to be the present discounted value of seller i
0s expected prot in period t, and Vi(t+1)
to be the present discounted value of seller i0s expected prot in period t + 1 conditional on the
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demand in period t being zero. Apparently we must have u = p: Suppose not and u < p; then the
expected prot for seller 1 from posting a price p is greater than that from posting a price u; i.e.,
V1(t) = q0V1(t+ 1) + q1V (p; 1) +
1X
j=2
qjp
> q0V1(t+ 1) + q1V (p; 1) +
1X
j=2
qju ; (21)
a contradiction. Since a seller is indierent between posting a price at u = p and posting a price
at l; we must have l = p2 according to the denition of p2: Then 8p 2 [p2; p] the following relation
holds:
(1  q0)V (p; 2) = q1[F (p)V (p; 1) + (1  F (p))p] +
1X
i=2
qip (22)
Therefore 8p 2 [p2; p]
@
@p
q1[F (p)V (p; 1) + (1  F (p))p] +
1X
i=2
qip]
= q1[
@
@p
F (p)V (p; 1)  p @
@p
F (p) + 1  F (p)] +
1X
i=2
qi = 0 (23)
which can be solved as:
F (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 ; p > p
1 
P1
2 qi
q1
[p V (p;1)p V (p;1)   1] ; p2  p  p
0 ; p < p2
; (24)
which is exactly W2(p): Q.E.D.
From above we see that it is not hard to nd an equilibrium in the selling game  (2; fqig1i=0); but
nding an equilibrium in the selling game  (N; fqig1i=0) becomes very complicated, and there is no
explicit solution for an equilibrium strategy when N is greater than ve. We give some denitions
rst. 8t s.t. St = n let Fn(p) : [0;1) ! [0; 1] denote the mixed-strategy played in an equilbrium,
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and dene ln = supfp : Fn(p) = 0g and un = inffp : Fn(p) = 1g: Also dene
Zk;n(x) =
kX
i=0

n  1
i

(1  x)n 1 ixi (25)
If there are n sellers in the market and one seller sets a price at p and other n  1 sellers play
mixed strategies according to the distribution function Fn(p);then Zk;n(Fn(p)) is just the probability
that there are at most k prices less than p.
Now we guess that an equilibrium has the following properties: in the selling game  (N; fqig1i=0);
each seller plays a mixed-strategy Fn() 8t s.t. St = n; and the expected prot for each is V (p;N):
Then the expected prot for a seller posting any price p 2 [lN ; uN ] should be equal to V (p;N); i.e.,
V (p; FN ) = q0V (p; FN ) + q1[Z0;N (FN (p))p+ (1  Z0;N (FN (p)))V (p;N   1)]
+:::+ qN 1[ZN 2;N (FN (p))p+ (1  ZN 2;N (FN (p)))V (p; 1)] +
1X
i=N
qip
=
1
1  q0 [
N 1X
i=1
qi[Zi 1;N (FN (p))p+ (1  Zi 1;N (FN (p)))V (p;N   i)] +
1X
i=N
qip]
= V (p;N) (26)
For any xed p 2 [lN ; uN ]; if we treat FN (p) as a variable x, then the equation (23) is a
polynomial of degreeN   1. Showing that there is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium
in the selling game  (N; fqig1i=0) is equivalent to showing that there is a unique real root between
[0,1] for any p 2 [lN ; uN ]; and it must be increasing in p: According to Abel's impossibility theorem,
there exist no explicit solutions for a polynomial of degree greater than four.3 However, we still
can show that a unique solution exists in this problem.
3Since we have N+2 parameters in this equation (q0; q1;..., qN 1;
P1
i=N qi; ; p); it becomes very complicated for
us to determine the number of roots between [0,1] in this equation. Some standard root-nding approaches such as
Fourier-Budan and Sturm are intractable in this problem.
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Dene Gn(x) : [0; 1]! R to be
Gn(x) =
Pn 1
i=1 qiZi 1;n(x)V (p; n  i) +
P1
i=n qipPn 1
i=1 qiZi 1;n(x) +
P1
i=n qi
(27)
and
Wn(p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 ; p  p
G 1n (p) ; pn  p  p
0 ; p  pn
(28)
With the denitions in place, we can state our main result.
Proposition 5 When qi > 0; i = 0; 1; :::N   1; and
P1
i=N qi 6= 0; the oligopoly model with a
general demand structure has a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium which exhibits price
dispersion. Specically, each seller plays Wn(p) for all t s:t: St = n constitutes a unique symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium in the selling game  (N; fqig1i=0); and the expected prot for each seller
is exactly V (p;N).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 says that when there is a positive probability of excess demand ( i.e.,
P1
i=N qi 6= 0
when there are N sellers in the market), each seller must play a non-degenerate mixed-strategy in
a unique equilbrium. Moreover, the greatest lower bound of the support of the distribution played
by sellers increases as the number of sellers decreases. However, it is still possible for us to observe
that the lowest market price is lower when N decreases. More competition in the market (higher
N) does not imply lower market prices.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a simple, dynamic model to explain the phenomenon of price dispersion
in an environment in which rms are capacity constrained, demand is uncertain, and search is
costless for consumers. First, we show that when in every period there is at most one consumer
coming to the market with some positive probability, price dispersion happens except the case of
duopoly, and the degree of price dispersion is unpredictable. Moreover, the lowest market price is
higher when sellers become more patient, the reservation price of consumers is higher, or demand is
stronger. Furthermore, this lowest market price is a decreasing and convex function of the number
of sellers. Secondly, with a generalized demand structure, when there is a positive probability of
excess demand, there exists a unique mixed-strategy symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
sellers set prices according to non-degenerate distributions, and the lowest possible market price is
decreasing in the number of sellers. Again, uniform price equilibria cannot appear in this case.
5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Pick any period t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::g: If in period t there is only one seller
remaining in the market, then the seller will simply set a price p = p = p1 in every period. Suppose
there are two sellers in the market in period t, and let Fi(p) : [0; p]! [0; 1] denote the strategy played
by seller i in period t (Fi(p) can be degenerate) in an equilbrium. Dene li = supfp : Fi(p) = 0g and
ui = inffp : Fi(p) = 1g: Also dene Vi(t) to be the present discounted value of seller i0s expected
prot in period t, and Vi(t + 1) to be the present discounted value of seller i
0s expected prot to
at period t+1 conditional on demand in period t is zero. We prove the proposition by establishing
the following claims:
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Claim 1. l1 = l2  p2: Suppose l1 6= l2 and WLOG let l1 < l2: Seller 1 can increase his prot
by putting all probability between [l1; l2) to l2   ": Hence in any equilibrium we must have l1 = l2:
Suppose now we have l1 = l2 < p

2 and F2(l2) < 1: Since a distribution is right continuous,
4 9
 2 (l2; p2) such that F2(l2)  F (p) < 1 8 p 2 (l2; ): Given seller 2's equilibrium strategy, seller
1's expected prot from setting any price p 2 (l2; ) is
V1(t) = qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F2(p))p]
< qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))V (p; 1) + (1  F2(p))V (p; 1)]
= qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p2 )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p

2)  F2(p2 ))
1
2
(V (p; 1) + p2) + (1  F2(p2))p2] (29)
Consequently we must have l1 = supfp : F1(p) = 0g  ; a contradiction! Also we notice that
l1 = l2 < p

2 and F2(l2) = 1 cannot hold in any equilibrium because seller 2's expected prot in this
case is
V2(t) = qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F1(l2)[1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
l2] + (1  F1(l2))l2]
< qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)V (p; 1)
= qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F1(p2 )V (p; 1)
+(F1(p

2)  F1(p2 ))
1
2
(V (p; 1) + p2) + (1  F1(p2))p2] (30)
Thus in an equilibrium we must have l1 = l2  p2:
4Here we use standard deniton of distribution function F (p) = (( 1; p]); where  is a nite Borel measure.
The right continuity of the distribution follows from the fact that a nite measure is continuous from above.
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Claim 2. u1 = u2 = p

2: Suppose u1 6= u2 and WLOG let u1 < u2: From Claim 1, we have
p2  u1 < u2: First, we observe that p2 < u1 < u2 cannot be supported by any equilibrium, for
if it is indeed the case then seller 2's expected prot from posting any p 2 (p2; u1) is greater than
that from posting any price p > u1; i:e:;8 p 2 (p2; u1)
V2(t) = qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F1(p )V (p; 1)
+(F1(p)  F1(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F1(p))p]
> qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F1(p )V (p; 1)
+(F1(p)  F1(p ))V (p; 1) + (1  F1(p))V (p; 1)]
= qV2(t+ 1) + (1  q)V (p; 1); (31)
which implies inffp : F2(p) = 1g  u1; and we get a contradiction. On the other hand, p2 =
u1 < u2 also cannot be sustained in any equilibrium, for seller 1's expected prot from posting any
p 2 (p2; u2) is greater than that from posting any price p  p2; i:e:;8 p 2 (p2; u2)
V1(t) = qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F2(p))p]
> qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)V (p; 1); (32)
which implies that F1(p

2) = 0; violating our premise that u1 = inffp : F1(p) = 1g: Therefore we
have shown that u1 = u2 in any equilibrium. Now suppose u1 = u2 > p

2: Combining the result
from Claim 1, there are two possible cases: either u1 = u2 > l1 = l2 = p

2 or u1 = u2  l1 = l2 > p2:
If u1 = u2 > l1 = l2 = p

2, dene
 = sup
p2[0;p]
[F2(p )V (p; 1) + (F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F2(p))p]; (33)
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then  is the supremum of seller 1's expected prot conditional on demand being one in period t,
and it is easy to see that p2 <  < u2: Seller 1's expected prot from posting any p 2 [p2; ) is
V1(t) = qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F2(p))p]
< qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
) + (1  F2(p))]
 qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1) + (1  F2(p ))]
 qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q) ; (34)
which implies that, given seller 2's strategy F2(p); seller 1 will never choose any p <  in period
t Therefore supfp : F1(p) = 0g   > p2: So we get a contradiction, and u1 = u2 > l1 = l2 = p2
cannot be the case in any equilibrium. On the other hand, u1 = u2  l1 = l2 > p2 also cannot be
supported in any equilibrium. Suppose u1 = u2  l1 = l2 > p2 in some equilibrium, and dene
 = sup
p2[0;p]
[F2(p )V (p; 1) + (F2(p)  F2(p ))(1
2
V (p; 1) +
1
2
p) + (1  F2(p))p]; (35)
then we have   l1 > p2: If F2(u2 ) = 1; then 9 0 < # < u2 such that F2(p) > 1  " 8p 2 (#; u2);
where " = (l1   p2)=(V (p; 1)=2 + 3u2=2): Therefore,
V1(t) = qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1)
+(F2(p)  F2(p ))1
2
(V (p; 1) + p) + (1  F2(p))p]
< qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[F2(p )V (p; 1) + "
2
(V (p; 1) + p) + "p]
 qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[V (p; 1) + "(1
2
V (p; 1) +
3
2
p)]
< qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)[V (p; 1) + "(1
2
V (p; 1) +
3
2
u2)]
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= qV1(t+ 1) + (1  q)l1; (36)
which implies that inffp : F1(p) = 1g  # < u2; a contradiction! Hence we must have F2(u2 ) < 1
in an equilibrium. Since u2 = inffp : F2(p) = 1g; F2(u2) F2(u2 ) > 0: It is easy to see that seller
1 will never set his price at u1 in period t (he can always get higher prot by cutting down the
price). Since u1 = inffp : F1(p) = 1g; we must have F1(u1 ) = 1; but this also cannot be sustained
in any equilibrium from our previous argument. Thus the necessary condition in an equilibrium is
that u1 = u2 = l1 = l2 = p

2; and it is easy to verify that it is indeed an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The statement is true for N=2 from Proposition 4. Suppose the
proposition is true for the selling game  (N   1; fqig1i=0): We prove it by establishing the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 Let n(x) : R! R be of the form
n(x) =
1(x)C1 + 2(x)C2 + :::+ n(x)Cn
1(x) + 2(x) + :::+ n(x)
;
where C1 < C2 < ::: < Cn, i(x)  0 is dierentiable for i=1,2,...,n, and n(x) 6= 0 8x 2 R: Then
@
@xW (x) > 0 if j(x)
@
@x [
Pn
i=j+1 i(x)]  
Pn
i=j+1 i(x)
@
@xj(x)  0 for j=1,...,n-1, and this holds
with strict inequality for some j.
Proof. The result is trivially true for n = 2. When n = 3, we can rewrite it as
3(x) =
1(x)C1 + 2(x)C2 + 3(x)C3
1(x) + 2(x) + 3(x)
=
1(x)C1 + [2(x) + 3(x)]f2(x)C2+3(x)C32(x)+3(x) g
1(x) + [2(x) + 3(x)]
(37)
Fixing 2(x)C2+3(x)C32(x)+3(x) ;
@
@x3(x) > 0 if 1(x)
@
@x [2(x) + 3(x)]   [2(x) + 3(x)] @@x1(x) > 0
(here we use the fact that C1 <
2(x)C2+3(x)C3
2(x)+3(x)
). Furthermore @@x
2(x)C2+3(x)C3
2(x)+3(x)
> 0 given that
22
2(x)
@
@x3(x) 3(x) @@x2(x) > 0: Hence we prove the case for n = 3. Applying a similar argument
for any n; we get the conditions stated above. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 @@xZk;n(x) =  (k + 1)
 
n 1
k+1

(1  x)n 2 kxk < 0 8 x 2 (0; 1)
Proof.
@
@x
Zk;n(x) =
@
@x
kX
i=0

n  1
i

(1  x)n 1 ixi
=
kX
i=0
[ (n  1  i)

n  1
i

(1  x)n 2 ixi + i

n  1
i

(1  x)n 1 ixi 1]
=
kX
i=0
[ (i+ 1)

n  1
i+ 1

(1  x)n 2 ixi + i

n  1
i

(1  x)n 1 ixi 1]
=  (k + 1)

n  1
k + 1

(1  x)n 2 kxk (38)
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 Given qi 6= 0 for i = 0; :::; n  1 and
P1
i=n qi > 0;
@
@xGn(x) > 0 8x 2 (0; 1)
Proof. We observe that V (p; n  1) < V (p; n  2) < ::: < V (p; 1) < p; fqiZi 1;n(x)gn 1i=1 > 0
and
P1
i=n qi > 0: Hence, it satises all of the conditions of Lemma 1. By lemma 2, we have
qn 1Zn 2;n(x)
@
@x
[
1X
i=n
qi]  [
1X
i=n
qi]
@
@x
[qn 1Zn 2;n(x)]
= [
1X
i=n
qi]qn 1(n  1)xn 2 > 0 8x 2 (0; 1) (39)
We can apply Lemma 1 if the following conditions hold: 8x 2 (0; 1); j = 3; :::; n
	j(x) =
qn j+1Zn j;n(x) @@x [
Pj 2
i=1 qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x) +
P1
i=n qi] 
[
Pj 2
i=1 qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x) +
P1
i=n qi]
@
@x [qn j+1Zn j;n(x)]
 0 (40)
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8x 2 (0; 1); j = 3; :::; n
	j(x) = qn j+1Zn j;n(x)
@
@x
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x) +
1X
i=n
qi]  (41)
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x) +
1X
i=n
qi]
@
@x
[qn j+1Zn j;n(x)]
= qn j+1Zn j;n(x)
@
@x
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x)] 
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x) +
1X
i=n
qi]
@
@x
[qn j+1Zn j;n(x)]
> qn j+1Zn j;n(x)
@
@x
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x)] 
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x)]
@
@x
[qn j+1Zn j;n(x)]
After simplication, we can get:
qn j+1Zn j;n(x)
@
@x
[
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x)]  [
j 2X
i=1
qn j+1+iZn j+i;n(x)]
@
@x
[qn j+1Zn j;n(x)]
= qn j+1
j 2X
i=1
n j+iX
k=n j+1
n jX
l=0
qn j+1+i

n  1
k

n  1
l

[(1  x)2n 2 l kxl+k](k   l) @
@x
log
x
1  x > 0
Hence, the lemma is established. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 The Wn(p) dened before is indeed a distribution with Wn(p) = 1 and Wn(p

n) = 0:
It is easy to see that Wn(p

n) = G
 1
n (p

n) = 0 and Wn(p) = G
 1
n (p) = 1: Since Gn(p) is strictly
increasing in [0,1], Wn(p) = G
 1
n (p) is well dened and increasing in [p

n; p]: Q:E:D:
Now the only thing that needs to be shown is that no one will deviate if the other N-1 sellers
play mixed-strategies according to WN (p) when there are N sellers in the market. It is equivalent
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to showing that setting any price between [pN ; p] gives a seller the same expected prots, i:e:;8p 2
[pN ; p]
V (p;N) =
1
1  q0 [
N 1X
i=1
qiV (p;N   i) +
1X
i=N
qip] (42)
=
1
1  q0
(
N 1X
i=1
qi[Zi 1(WN (p))p+ (1  Zi 1(WN (p)))V (p;N   i)] +
1X
i=N
qip
)
or
1X
i=N
qip =
N 1X
i=1
qiZi 1(WN (p))[p  V (p;N   i)] +
1X
i=N
qip (43)
Therefore,
p =
PN 1
i=1 qiZi 1(WN (p))V (p;N   i) +
P1
i=N qipPN 1
i=1 qiZi 1(WN (p)) +
P1
i=N qi
(44)
which is exactly the denition of WN (p): Q.E.D.
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